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In 1873 a ship of the United.States, the Virginius, was captured 
by a Spanish ship and taken into the port of Santiago de Cuba, where 
the Spanish began to shoot members of her crew and passengers in 
platoons. The U.S. attempted to mobilize a naval squadron, but was 
unable to gather any formidable fleet, and the crisis passed (Millis, 1956). 
America's physical isolation from the rest of the world had always been 
considered its best defense. Offensive capability had been considered an 
unnecessary and expensive encumbrance. Even as late as 1880, of the 
1492 ships listed by the navy, only 48 were able.to fire a gun (ibid.). 
During the early 1880's the navyls.largest ship was. sunk by colliding 
with a coal barge. 
However, by 1883, the Congress was beginning to steadily increase 
the size and capability--both offensive and defensive--of the navy. In 
1889, the U.S. acquired part of Samoa, with the justification that it was 
needed as a coaling station. By the end of the following decade, U.S. 
military forces had been dispatched all over the world in such countries 
as Hawaii, Brazil, Nicaragua, Venezuela, China, Philippines, and of course 
Cuba. 
The change in military capability accompanied a change in 
the articulated justification of military matters and in the diplomatic 
stance of the government. Toward the end of the century, a doctrine of 
military preparedness acquired increasing currency. It was argued that the 
- 
nation must be militarily prepared for war, just in case the occasion should 
arise. This new doctrine argued not only that the best defense was 
a good offense, but that as a newly great nation, the U.S. had more to 
lose in more parts of the world than it had previously. 
Military capability was necessary to back up the diplomatic leadership 
of a newly great nation. In 1896, President Cleveland resurrected the 
Monroe Doctrine, declaring the Western Hemisphere off limits to Europe. 
He updated the doctrine by declaring the U.S. the peacekeeper and overseer 
of the area. By the turn of the century the U.S. was acquiring its own 
political colonies. 
The culmination was the Spanish-American War of 1898. Now it was 
the U.S.' turn to destroy the Spanish navy, which it did handily in the 
Battle of Manila in the Philippines. The U.S. was becoming accepted 
by European nations as a great nation, still a second-rate power, but 
a respected force to be reckoned with. To the non-European world, the 
U.S. was increasingly being seen as an imperialist power.' "Great power" 
and "imperialist power" became two sides of the same coin. 
"Imperialism" describes a relationship between nations, or between 
a set of nations, not just a characteristic of a particular nation. 
It is an asymmetric relationship characterized by the penetration of one 
society by the agents of another, the creation of dependence, the extraction 
of resources (not necessarily natural resources), and the development of 
control structures oriented to the demands of the larger country. 
Revisionist historians such as William Appleman Williams and 
Richard VanAlstyne have discussed the continuity of an imperialist 
orientation in American politics. They demonstrate the roots of 
imperialist sentiment anong the founding fathers and its subsequent 
development through American history up the Cold War. However, they 
fail to deal with the discontinuity in the machinery of imperialism-- 
the military, diplomatic, and economic apparatus that gave a bite to 
America's imperialist bark. 
It is this discontinuity that I am trying to explain. Throughout 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century the U.S. increasingly penetrated 
other parts of the world, created instruments of control and dependence 
of other nations, and extracted resources from abroad, all administered 
through organizational means--military, diplomatic, and economic. 
This paper will argue that conventional explanations of U.S. 
imperialism, which have concentrated on internal dynamics of the United 
States, are inadequate and ungeneralizable. Rather I suggest focusing 
attention on changes in the international system and changes in the 
role that the U.S. played in that system. It is argued that as the 
system expanded and decentralized, resources in the system became more 
available to the U.S. while internal changes in the U.S. political 
and economic structure, which were substantially facilitated by the 
international environment, increased the ability of the U.S. to participate 
more fully in the expansion of the international system. 
r The paper will first survey the most widely cited endogenous 
theories of the rise of U.S. imperialism leading up the Spanish-American 
War, followed by an outline of the development of the international 
system in that period. I will then sketch the interaction between 
change in the U.S. and change in the international system. 
Endogenous explanations -- of U.S. imperialism 
Conventional explanations of the rise of imperialist structures 
and actions in the last part of the nineteenth century have characterist- 
ically been c~dogenous  explanatfcns, that is, their focus of 
examination has been processes that are internal to the United States. 
Imperialism has been seen as the result of domestic developments 
affecting government decision-making about foreign policy. 
There are four common explanations of the U.S. imperialist surge 
in this period: (1) the extension of America's Manifest Destiny to 
a new frontier; (2) a displacement of frustrations felt as part of a 
psychic crisis in the nation; (3) the maturation of a generation 
untouched by the horrors of the Civil War: and (4) the requisite expansion 
of markets, sources of raw materials, and new sources of investment 
concomitant with industrialization and the development of finance 
capitalism. The first three treat imperialism as a temporary aberration 
from a more benign foreign policy-Lan aberration that was corrected by 
such reformers as Woodrow Wilson. The last sees this period'as a transition 
to an enduring relationship of the U.S. to the rest of the world. The 
last perspective is also the only perspective that can he put into the 
context of the larger international picture. 
The interrelated notions of ~meric'a's Manifest Destiny and empire 
as the new frontier were among the most popular theories of imperialism 
among academics -around the turn of the century. Social Darwinism was 
wedded to a resurrected ideology of Manifest Destiny. This marriage gave 
birth to an argument on behalf of expansion by the superior white race 
and its democratic institutions. In 1893, Frederick Jackson Turner 
introduced his "Frontier Thesis." His highly influential argument 
was that the frontier had been the prime shaper of America's uniqueness. 
It was the key to the orderly development of political democracy, equality 
of opportunity, and individualism. A corollary of this argument was 
that the closing of the frontier when it reached the Pacific would lead to 
calcification of American society.   quality of opportunity would be 
replaced by the rise of aristocracy. Decadence would undermfne hardy 
individualism. And the disappearance of the safety valve would result 
in increased malcontent and violence. Alchough Turner himself was not 
an expansionist, his ideas were used quite effectively by imperialist 
partisans. 
The historians who succeeded Turner pointed to the importance 
of the frontier in American history and identified an expansionist 
I I urgev--an urge that could not be confined within the continental 
borders of the U.S. Thus westward expansion and international 
expansion were seen as arising from the same source. Imperialism 
was merely the continental cup running over. 
The "expansionist urge" has been given an economic treatment by 
revisionist historians such as William Appleman Williams (1966, 1972) 
and Richard VanAlstyne (1960). Both discuss the continuity of American 
imperialist orientation. Williams places more emphasis on the economic 
changes underlying changes in imperialist sentiment as it moved from 
mercantilism through laissez faire to the age of corporate capitalism. 
An explanation that takes greater account of the historical uniqueness 
of the decades around the turn of the century is Hofstadter's notion 
of "Psychic Crisis" (1968). He explains that the later expansion 
was into territory inhabited by aliens, with no intention of incorporating 
these territories into the United States. He cites the imperialist debate 
of the period as an indication that contemporaries of the period also 
understood such expansion as a departure. The drive toward colonial 
expansion, he argues, can be explained by a psychic crisis in American society 
caused by the depressions of the 'last quarter of the nineteenth 
century, the labor violence of the period, and the assault on democratic 
sensibilities resulting from the tumultuous election of 1896, which 
exhibited a polarization reminiscent of the pre-civil War era. The jingo 
press, spearheaded by sensationalist competition of Pulitzer and 
Hearst, shifted the attention of the nation from its own domestic 
troubles into the international sphere. Personal economic problems 
were displaced into international aggression. 
A variation on the psychic crisis theme is the "cyclical-nature- 
of-war" argument. It has been noted that major wars generally fall 
about a generation apart. When a generatfon has experienced a war, it 
becomes anathema to its members to submit themselves again to such torture. 
But the maturation of a new generation removes the deterrent of such 
memories, and the nation gives way to pressures that lead them once 
again down the path of carnage. A simplistic version of 
this argument identifies human.nature as the force pushing toward 
war.. More sophisticated versions discuss economic competition among 
nations or the influence of strong military pressure groups. 
The generational perspective has rested on two arguments. 
Identification of the imperialist and anti-imperialist groups has 
shown that there is a substantial age difference in the members of 
these two groups. The leaders of the anti-imperialist organizations 
averaged about twenty years older than the leading imperialists. 
Most of the leading exponents of colonial imperialism and the war 
were not old enough to remember the C,?.vil ?"r;r. Sec~n?~: ' .p ,  belligerent 
partisans such as Theodore Roosevelt argued that the war would toughen 
and purify the moral fiber of the nation. War, Roosevelt argued, 
was the answer to what he felt was the moral degeneration of the 
nation. In the end he lamented that the "grand little war" had not 
been much of a war, but had been better than no war at all. 
The only conventional explanation that goes beyond ideological 
or psychic explanations of imperialism is that industrialization 
created a need for raw materials, while capitalism, a concomitant 
of industrialism, created a need for foreign investments. Walter LaFeber 
(1963) is the leading proponent of this point of view. He concentrates on 
the need for foreign markets. Like Hofstadter, he points to the 
depressions of the last quarter of the century, especially the 
Depression of 1893. Similarly, he points to a sense of crisis felt 
in the nation. However, whereas Hofstadter is talking about a sense 
of crisis in the society at large, LaFeber focuses on a sense of 
crisis among the business community. The country was felt to be in 
deep economic trouble. There was near consensus in the business 
community, as articulated in the business press, that the answer 
was foreign markets. He then argues that the government shared this 
opinion and acted upon it. 
None of these explanations takes into account the fact that the 
other industrial nations of the world--Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, 
etc. were involved in imperialist excursions in the last third of 
the nineteenth century. Africa was partitioned in the 1880's. 
Britain was intensifying its penetration of India and the Near East, 
and hassling with the U.S. over control of Latin America. European 
statesmen rose and fell on their.success in the acquisition of new 
territory. Almost all the industrial nations were trying to get 
a piece of the Orient. Even Japan, the newest industrial nation, 
was flexing its imperialist muscle in the Far East. 
The explanations discussed above for U.S. imperialism do not 
apply to the European countries. There is no analogy to the Manifest 
Destiny notion. The Europeans did not start from an internal frontier, 
then expand to the edge of the sea and on across it. Although 
industrialization is a precondition to modern~imperialism, it can 
hardly explain the onset of imperialist policies of a particular 
country. Industrialization proceeded at different rates in different 
nations, with no perceptible pattern between the timing of industrializa- 
tion and imperialist activity. If a certain level of industrialization 
created a need that could be met only with imperialist solutions, 
we would find that industrializing nations, as they reached the right 
plateau would each, in turn, become imperialist. Instead, we find 
that within a short period of time, all nations above a certain level 
of industrialization became imperialist. 
If none of these explanations are adequate, how do we account for 
the common turn toward imperialism in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century? The answer lies in their membership in a common system, an 
international economic and political system. Imperialism in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century did not arise from processes within 
individual nations, but from characteristics of the world system. In 
a word, imperialism was one aspect of a transition from a unipolar, 
relatively stable, international system into a multipolar competitive 
system. 
Expansion and change in the international system 
From 1815, the world economy had centered around Britain. It 
was divided between one highly industrial nation, Britain, industrializing 
nations, which included most of Western Europe and the U.S., and the 
undeveloped regions. There was a relatively stable division of labor. 
Britain produced manufactured goods for a good part of the world. It 
imported raw materials and exported manufactured goods. Both undeveloped 
and developing nations were dependent on Britain as a market for raw 
materials and foodstuffs. The industrializing nations produced most 
of the agricultural goods they needed, but were dependent on Britain 
for manufactured goods, for capital, and for technological knowledge. 
The system ran relatively smoothly. It was the golden age of "free trade." 
After 1870, the system began to change. Not only was there a 
massive increase in the volume of international trade and exchange, 
there was fundamental change in the structure of the system. British 
hegemony was challenged by Germany and the U.S. in the West and by 
Japan in the East. The last quarter of the nineteenth century witnessed 
the relative decline of Britain in the world system. By the turn of 
the century both Germany and the U.S. had surpassed Britain in the 
production of steel. The total industrial output of the U.S. passed 
that of Britain. The reaction by the European nations to these changes 
was an imperial grab for the undeveloped parts of the world. 
Thus, imperialism was a reflection of the concomitant expansion 
of the international system and change in the relative dominance of 
national actors. As the international economy expanded, the stable 
unipolar economic system changed to a multi-polar competitive system. 
Expansion meant both increase in the volume of trade and extension . 
of the boundaries of the system. Between 1860 and 1910 gross inter- 
national trade increased an average of 46% per decade (Kuznets, 1966). 
The international system bounded by the North Atlantic.was expanded 
to encompass the globe. Economically this involved the expansion 
of capital investment and trade. Politically, it involved a flurry 
of cqlony grabbing--the partition of Africa, the carving out of spheres 
of influence in Asia and the.Near East. Colonial regimes and politically 
independent,, but economically dependent regimes in the third world 
nations were strengthened as nation-building activities were undertaken. 
These included methods of extraction, control, and servicing, structured 
around the needs of developing export economies. Customs facilities were 
built, roads and railroads constructed, and armies and police forces 
equipped to maintain stability when threatened by native resistance. 
Changes in the structure of the international economy were highlighted 
by the demise of British hegemony and the ascension of the U.S., Germany, 
and Japan. British primacy of the international market declined until 
after the First World War when it totally evaporated. The British share 
of world trade in primary products fell from 30% in 1876 to 19% in 
1913, its share of the world export market of manufactured goods fell 
from 41.4% in 1880 to 2q.9% in 1913. In the same period Germany's 
share rose from 19.3% to 26.5% and the U.S. from 2.8% to -12.6% (Hobsbawm, 1968). 
Between 1899 and 1913 the U.S. and Germany accounted for more than 
half the increase in total exports of manufactured products from the 
major industrial countries (Alcroft, 1968). 
Between the 1850's and 1870, there was a considerable shift in 
the distribution of British foreign investment from the Atlantic 
economy to the larger world economy. This acceleration of an earlier 
pattern was characterized by a steep decline in the proportion of 
British investment in Europe and a marked increase in the investment 
in British colonies and dominions. British investment in Europe 
had decreased from 66% in 1830 to 55% in 1854. By 1870, only 25% 
of British investment was in Europe, and by 1914, it was down to a 
bare 5% (Kenwood and Lougheed, 1971). 
Investment in the colonies and dominions rose from 5% of all 
foreign investment in 1857 to 33% in 1870. Two thirds of that amount 
was in India or 22% of the total. By 1914, the colonies and dominions 
were absorbing 46% of all British foreign investment (ibid.). The 
share absorbed by the Western hemisphere remained nearly the same. 
The U.S. absorbed about a quarter of the total although the type of 
investment in the U.S. shifted from agriculture, dominated by cotton, 
to industrial, dominated by the railroads and other heavy industry. 
Investment in Latin America averaged about a sixth of all foreign 
investment over the entire period (ibid.). 
Even in absolute terms, British investment in Europe was stagnant. 
It barely increased from just under $700 million in 1854 to slightly 
over $930 million in 1870 and crept up to $1,000 million by 1914. At 
the same time, investments in the colonies and dominions had grown from 
just over $60 million to $1250 million in 1870 and mushroomed to 
over $5 billion by 1914. 
Decentralization in the international economy is reflected not 
only in the quantitative leveling among nations, but in a loosening of 
the network of trade. British centrality in the 'network gave way to a 
more decentralized system. 
Between 1870 and 1913, developments in the multilateral payments 
system eased the international flow of capital, commodities, services, and 
income payments, greatly facilitating commercial relations. This was 
an important factor in the expansion of trade discussed above. 
Prior to 1870, the network was structured around a set of 
relatively disconnected trade triangles. Each developed out of 
different circumstances, but each had Britain at the center. One 
triangle included Britain, Western Europe and the Baltic. There 
was a slave triangle--Britain, Africa, and the West Indies. Britain, 
China and India formed another. And Britain, the U.S. and Latin 
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America formed a fourth triangle, in which British deficits in the U.S. 
were offset by surpluses in the Latin American states  e en wood and 
Lougheed, 1971). 
After 1870, this system changed as the triangles became emeshed 
into a more complex pattern that was wider in scope. Non-British 
nations were developing stronger ties among themselves, although Britain 
continued to be at the center of the hub. Within the new system, the 
United States and Germany emerged as separate links in the chain of inter- 
national trade. 
At the beginning of the period most of the U.S. trade was 
primary products and was with Europe. In 1876, 81.5% of all U.S. 
exports went to Europe, including Britain. By 1901, the figure had 
dropped to 76.4%, it fell to 50.0% by 1913 (1T.S. Department of 
Commerce, 1961). The U.S. had a surplus with Europe and a deficit 
with the rest of the world. By the mid-18901s, the U.S. was a net 
exporter of manufactures. It had a large surplus with Britain and the 
Great Plains--Canada and Australia (not to be confused with the Great 
Plains region of the U.S.). It was this surplus with the Great Plains 
that financed a deficit in the tropics. The tropics, on the other hand, 
had a surplus with Europe, which partly balanced their deficit with Britain. 
The U.S. was becoming less dependent on economic links with Europe and 
expanding its ties to the rest of the world. 
After the 1880's Germany also emerged as a separate link in 
the network. Germany was experiencing rapid industrialization and 
a relative decline in ies agriculture. The Great Plains states 
started to replace the U.S. as the source of surplus in agricultural 
commodities. During this period, German deffcfts with other European 
countries became surpluses as the Gem-ans found them to be a healthy 
market for manufactured goods. 
The role of the newly powerful nations in the expansion of the world 
system was partial and indirect. They contributed to each of-the two 
developments that we have been discussing: the increased volume of 
activity and the change in structural centralization. Their penetration 
I 
into markets of the old nations, 'both in and out of Europe was a competitve 
challenge and anupset of equilibrium in the network of payments, creating 
a need for new sources of trade surplus. At the same time the nations of. 
Europe were becoming more c?.osed from each other by.such means as raising 
protective tariffs. - 
As the European system expanded, peripheral areas became sites of 
profitable activity for the new as well as the old power. The doctrine 
expressed by French Premier Jules Ferry in 1890 was to be echoed by. 
Americans later in the decade: 
Colonial policy is the daughter of industrial policy. The 
protectionist system is a steam-engine without a safety 
valve if it does not have as correlative and auxiliary a 
healthy and serious colonial policy. . .European powers of 
*:onsc~r+_ini. ??-n_ s z  trzrated. New masses of consumers must be 
made to arise in other parts of the globe, else we shall 
put modern society into bankruptcy and prepare for the dawn 
of the twentieth century a cataclysmic social liquidation of 
which one cannot calculate the consequences. 
(quoted in Moon, 1927 p. 44) 
These changes undermined the equilibrium in the international 
system upon which the system of free trade had depended. Free trade 
was a system in which stability had been maintained and competition 
limited through British hegemony. Control in the international 
system had operated through a system of interdependency such that 
each actor maximized his position in the system through playing the 
system as it existed. The system of interdependency operated to maintain 
British hegemony But as newly developing nations (U.S., Germany, and 
Japan) cut into markets originally cornered by older nations (especially 
Britain) these older countries, followinp British lead, turned to colonial 
policies to recoup their losses. The British reaction to the challenge 
against her hegemony was penetration into new areas of the world. 
Other nations reacted in a similar fashion. 
Leaving the economic sphere for the moment,,iqcreased competitfveness 
in the international system is evident in the dintomatic arena 
as well. Singer.and Small (1966) discuss changes in the international' 
diplomatic system in this period. From 1815, the beginning of the 
formal system of diplomacy, until about 1878, there was a multi-polar 
system, operating on a balance of power. Britain was clearly the 
strongest state, but did not .exercise hegemonic dominance. Deviation 
in the system induced the operation of feedback mechanisms. Aggression 
in an area was met with multilateral action, designed to conserve 
the balance of power. 
After 1879, the system atrophied. Alliances for longer terms 
began to rigidify the system. An increase in bipolar alliances 
hampered the operation of feedback mechanisms. Smaller nations, 
becoming less confident in the operation of the system for protection, 
began to make bipolar alliances with larger nations for protection. 
The major powers were losing confidence in the system to fulfill 
their needs and increasingly acted for their immediate self-interest 
and paid less attention to the effect of their behavior on the system 
as a whole. The competition, Singer and Small argue, led to the 
imperialistic scramble, the arms race, and finally, the F$rst World War. 
U.S. Imperialism 
Germany and the U.S. were latecomers into the imperialist 
venture. As challengers, they did not have the same defensive reaction 
. . 
to changes in the international economy as the more established idwers. 
Their first goal'was penetration of the old system. Moreover they 
both lacked the domestic political structure and military apparatus 
to compete successf~lly internationally. 
The conspicious~'emergence of imperialism is a reflection of 
a changing'relationship between the environment and government and 
enterprise in a country. The changes in the structure of the inter- 
national system made it more accessible as a pool of resources to 
enterprise i,n the U.S., while eneerprise in this country changed in 
ways that made it more capable of tapping those resources abroad. 
The U.S. government was increasingly able to mobilize the resources 
necessary to act as a great power in the int&rnational political 
system--a iowei-ful military machine, 'influence over the foreign policy 
of other nations, and a strong financial apparatus, both private 
and public. . 
U.S. economic imperialism was an outgrowth of the.economic place 
of the U.S. in the international system. U.S. colonialism was a 
reflection of attempts to penetrate parts of the international system, 
activity which was impossible without a national economy and a strong 
national state with an effective military and diplomatic apparatus. 
In other words, the significant d&velbpment leading up to the spanish- 
American War is not the motivation to control, but the novel capacity 
for control. 
American ability to tap international resources was enhanced 
. . 
in three ways: 
(1) As indigenous financial institutions grew, the relative 
control by Europeans over the U.S. economy decreased. 
The creation of a national economy enhanced international activity 
but the creation of a national economy was financed substantially by 
international investment in the U.S. In the 28 years from 1869 to 
1897 the amount of foreign investment in the U.S. more than doubled* 
from $1.5 billion (mostly in government bonds and some railroad 
securities) to $3.4 billion (1J.S. Department of Commerce, 1961) with 
much of the increase coming from reinvestment. Over approximately 
the same period, from 1870 to 1900, the value of manufacturing capital 
of the U.S. multiplied more than five times, from $1.7 billion to 
$9.8 billion (Nearing and Freeman, 1925). , . 
The structure of capitalization changed in ways that was 
favorable to American control of the economy. From 1870 to the end 
of the century, "The United States was becoming self-sufficient with 
respect to its capital needs, and indeed was soon to reach the 
point of providing capital needs for other nations." (Eyers, 1951, 
(2) The scope of formerly local markets,in the U . S .  was becomin~ 
increasingly national and international as the economy became dominated 
by giant corporations. The growth of the railroads not only made 
possible the transportation of goods across long distances, but 
provided the occasion for the development of national investment 
markets. This period saw the development of national corporations, 
a flurry of mergers, monopolies and oligopolies. By 1904, 318 
industrial combinations, including 530 separate establishments 
owned 40% of all manufacturing interests (Eichner, 1969; Ashworth, 
1952). At the same time, total current prices of exported merchandise 
nearly tripled from $526 million in 1876 to $1460 million in 1901 (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1961). By 1893, American trade exceeded that of 
every country in the world except Britain (LaFeber, 1963). Not only 
were exports crucial to the econ0rr.y objectively, but there was a near 
consensus among the business community and the political leadership 
in the latter part of the century that exports were the key to economic 
well-being (ibid.; Pratt, 1936). 
(3) The national government was involved in state-making activities, 
expanding its jurisdiction into new areas of society and developing. 
the organizational apparatus to exercise these new jurisdictions. 
The national government had a stake in imperialism over and above 
facilitating domestic prosperity through foreign economic activity. 
Industry and finance were necessary for the U.S. to be a ereat power 
in the world, a goal that had existed since the nation was born. State- 
making activities involved both internal political consolidation--as 
national political structures were erected--and external expansion--as 
the diplomatic and military apparatus benefitting a great power were 
developed. 
Dominance in the national government was shifting from the 
legislative to the executive as the government was beginning to develop 
national policies rather than responding to specific issues. Government 
revenue doubled from-$281 million in 1875 to $589 million in 1901 (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1961). The coercive power of the national 
government was strengthened by the expansion, consolidations and profession- 
alization of the army and navy, especially the navy. 
Conclusior! 
This paper has identified some of the shortcomings of endogenous 
explanations of nineteenth century American imperialism. The foremost 
criticism is that the myopia of most conventional accounts has precluded 
integration with accounts of concomitant European imperialism. 
The questions raised by this discussion have to do with the 
interaction between the growth of the international system and the 
development of new stronp states. It has been the thesis that 
growth and chance in the international economic and political system 
in the last third of the nineteenth century enhanced the economic 
and political development of the United States (as well as Ger~any 
and Japan), which in turn, substantially chanped the international 
system, the consequence of which is imperialism. 
This raises general questions about the development of national 
states and about the effect of new actors in the international system. 
Our focus on the develpment of political structures has shifted 
attention away from the the leherian issues of le~itimation, rationali- 
zation, and participation, which have dominated sociolo~ical treatment 
of the subject--issues which are found in the work of Bendix (1969) 
Lipset (1963) and Huntinpton (1?66), and in the voluminous literature 
on political modernization of third world nations. States are treated 
as autonomous units, chanping in response to endo~enous processes. 
The emphasis here has been on the material and structural preconditions 
that make possible the growth of administrative bureaucracies, instruments 
of coercion and penetration by the state into society--issues found in 
the works of Tilly (1?74), Moore (1366), and others. 
In dealing with the international system, this paper has not dealt -in 
detail with the consequences of horizontal dimensions, such as polarity, 
homogeneity, and stahility, which are found in works by Deutsch and Singer 
(1964), Kim (1970), Kaplan (n.d,) , and Luard (1968). . Rather I have focused 
on the vertical dimension, including variables such as dominance and 
centrality, as in the work of Wallerstefn (1971, 19721, Bukharin (1966), 
or Singer and Small (1366). 
. The final, unanswered question is che generalizibility of these 
processes. It is no doubt true that the growth of polltical and 
economic structures in developing nations is substantially related to 
their relationship to the international system. But unlike American 
expansion, there is little periphery for the new nations to draw resources 
from. However, there are indications that some of the third world nations 
are increasingly able to challenge the hegemony of the developed nations. 
Not only are the Arabs presenting an economic challenge, but probably 
more important in the long run are possible political challenges from 
China and such increasingly strong nations as Brazil, in Latin America, 
and Indonesia in the Pacific." Our daily headlines are already reminding us 
of some of the consequences of these developments. ?hese consequences fall 
I 
into the agenda not only of sociologists of development, but also 
sociologists of the polity and economy in general. The rise of a world - 
economic and political system is one of the central facts of modern history, 
but it is a fact that social scientists have been slow to recognize. Such 
a recognition can be a corrective lens that can bring into focus issues that 
have formerly been blurred by myopic observation. Such change can only be 
for the better. 
*There are, of course, also equally strong arguments for the continued 
dependence of third world nations on the "superpowers." See e.g. Cockeroft, 
et . al. (1972). 
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